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Abstract

Applications of deep learning models and convolutional neural networks have been rapidly
increased. Although state-of-the-art CNNs provide high accuracy in many applications,
recent investigations show that such networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
The black-box adversarial attack is one type of attack that the attacker does not have any
knowledge about the model or the training dataset, but it has some input data set and their
labels.
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to generate a black-box attack in a sparse
domain, whereas the most critical information of an image can be observed. Our investigation
shows that large sparse (LaS) components play a crucial role in the performance of image
classifiers. Under this presumption, to generate an adversarial example, we transfer an image
into a sparse domain and add noise to the LaS components. We propose a comprehensive
evaluation and analysis to support our idea in chapter one.
In chapter two, we propose a new preprocessing approach that can enhance the robustness of skin lesion classification. Machine learning models based on convolutional neural
networks have been widely used for automatic recognition of lesion diseases with high accuracy compared to conventional machine learning methods. In this research, we proposed a
new preprocessing technique to extract the skin lesion dataset’s region of interest (RoI).
We compare the performance of the most state-of-the-art convolutional neural networks
classifiers with two datasets that contain (1) raw and (2) RoI extracted images. Our experiment results show that training CNN models by RoI extracted dataset can improve
the prediction accuracy. It significantly decreases the evaluation and training time of the
classification task.

Finally, we propose a secure and robust image denoising approach. Image denoising aims
to obtain the original image from its noisy measurements. While the quality of image denoising has been increasing over the years, the complexity and the required memory to implement
the denoising task have also been increased accordingly. With such advancements and the
unlimited computing resources available in the cloud, trends to transfer the image denoising
task to the cloud have grown over the past years. However, it is still quite challenging to utilize cloud-based resources without compromising users’ data privacy while maintaining the
quality of image denoising. In this chapter, we propose a novel lossless privacy-preserving
image denoising approach that protects the users’ privacy and simultaneously keeps the
quality of the denoising task.
Our proposed approach is suitable for computationally constrained devices such as many
IoT devices. In this method, we use two random keys to permute and perturb the noisy
image patches. The cloud service provider implements the denoising task on the encrypted
signal. After denoising, the output signal is still encrypted, and the real user who has
access to the keys would be able to decrypt the denoised image. We evaluate the security of
this method against known-plaintext, brute-force, and side-channel attacks. In addition, we
theoretically prove the lossless property of this method. To verify the applicability of this
approach, we implemented our experiments on multiple real images, and two well-known
evaluation metrics were used to compare our results with the baseline.

vii

Chapter 1: The Robustness of Deep Learning Models against Adversarial
Attacks

Applications of machine learning (ML) models and convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
have been rapidly increased. Although state-of-the-art CNNs provide high accuracy in many
applications, recent investigations show that such networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. The black-box adversarial attack is one type of attack in which the attacker
does not have any knowledge about the model or the training dataset, but it has some input
data set and their labels. In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to generate a blackbox attack in a sparse domain, whereas the most important information of an image can be
observed 1 .
Our investigation shows that large sparse (LaS) components play a critical role in the
performance of image classifiers. Under this presumption, to generate an adversarial example, we transfer an image into a sparse domain and put a threshold to choose only k LaS
components. In contrast to the very recent works that randomly perturb k low frequency
(LoF) components, we perturb k LaS components either randomly (query-based) or in the
direction of the most correlated sparse signal from a different class. We show that LaS components contain some middle or higher frequency components information, which leads to
fooling image classifiers with fewer queries.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by fooling six state-of-the-art image
classifiers, the TensorFlow Lite (TFLite) model of Google Cloud Vision platform, and the
YOLOv5 model as an object detection algorithm. Mean squared error (MSE), and peak
1

This chapter was published in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computational Intelligence [1].
Permission is included in Appendix A.
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signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) are used as quality metrics. We also present theoretical proof
to connect these metrics to the perturbation level in the sparse domain.

1.1

Introduction
By the ever-increasing demands for analyzing and processing large datasets, ML algo-

rithms and particularly deep learning techniques have become the center of attention of many
companies and service providers. The remarkable performance of CNNs for image segmentation, classification, and object tracking could provide acceptable solutions for many problems
encountered in computer vision and biomedical engineering [2, 3, 4]. While almost CNNs
perform well and provide high accuracy, their robustness toward some malicious attacks still
is not acceptable [5, 6, 7]. Applying some perturbation on the input data may undermine
the high accuracy of a classifier since ML models are usually trained and deployed in benign
settings. In other words, they do not consider certain scenarios in which an attacker can
compromise the performance of the system.
Recently, many works have been proposed to point out the vulnerability of CNNs against
adversarial scenarios [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. By slightly perturbing the input data, the ML classifier
may fool and predict a wrong label. If this perturbation is small enough to the human eyes,
then the perturbed image is called an adversarial example [6, 13, 14]. This problem can
be viewed from a different perspective; if we add a limited perturbation to an image, while
human eyes may detect the perturbation, still we expect the classifiers to classify correctly.
It opens up a new horizon of the robustness of ML models against adversarial examples.
An adversarial example can be obtained by solving the following minimization problem

||r ||2

s.t. C (x + r ) ̸= C (x)

(1.1)

where r is adversarial perturbation, ||.||2 is the Euclidean norm or ℓ2 norm, x is the legitimate
image (original image), and C (.) yields the classifier’s output label. Based on (1.1), there
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are two factors in generating adversarial examples, first having a minimum perturbation on
the legitimate image, and the second, fooling the classifier output.
Misclassification and targeted misclassification attacks are two major goals of adversarial
examples. In the misclassification attack, an adversary tries to fool the ML classifier by
misclassifying a legitimate example to different classes other than the original one. For
example, a legitimate image with label 1 of the MNIST (Modified National Institute of
Standards and Technology) dataset is perturbed in such a way that ML classifier yields an
output label belongs to {0,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, yet not 1. The attacker tries to fool the classifier
to yield a targeted label in targeted misclassification. For example, the same legitimate
image with a label 1 is labeled as a specific number like 8 by the classifier. In this chapter,
we focus on misclassification attacks.
Adversarial examples can be generated based on two different approaches: white-box
and black-box. In white-box attacks, the attacker has comprehensive knowledge about the
training dataset, model parameters, number of CNN layers, loss function, and the whole
structure of the model. There are numerous works based on white-box attacks, such as fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) [15], beyond the image space approach that uses physical space
features of 3D images, [16], deepfool [17], Jacobean-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA)[18].
For example, FGSM generates an adversarial perturbation for a given legitimate image by
computing the gradient of the cost function with respect to the legitimate image of the ML
algorithm as follows:

x ∗ = x + ϵ sign (∇x J (x, c))

(1.2)

where ϵ denotes a small scalar value which regulates the perturbation’s level, c is the input
label, J () denotes the model cost function, ∇x is the gradient of the trained model with
respect to the legitimate image, and sign(.) is the common mathematical function which
yields the sign of its input argument. The common property of white-box attacks is utilizing
the model’s information for generating the adversarial example. In contrast, the black-box
3

attack does not have any information about the model’s structure, parameters, and training
dataset[19, 20, 21, 22]. This type of attack is more practical because access to the training
dataset is not possible in many cases. Also, some information such as the model’s parameters,
number of layers, and loss function may not be public.
Black-box attacks can be separated into three categories: non-adaptive, adaptive, and
strictly black-box attacks [13]. In a non-adaptive black-box attack, an attacker can have
access only to the distribution of the training dataset [23]. In the adaptive black-box case,
the attacker does not have any information about the distribution of the dataset; however,
she can access the target model as an oracle. It means the attacker can query the output
labels of legitimate samples as well as adversarial samples [24, 25]. In the strict black-box
attack, the attacker does not have access to the dataset’s training distribution, and she
cannot adaptively modify the input query to observe the model’s output. In other words,
an attacker can query the legitimate input samples, but if she slightly perturbs an input
sample to observe its output label, the system identifies this process as a malicious attack
[26, 13]. Although these types of systems may provide a high level of security, in many real
cases input samples may be very similar to each other and as a result, there is no need to
block the user. Adaptive black-box attacks are more applicable than non-adaptive or strict
black-box attacks as they do not have any knowledge about the distribution of the training
dataset and assume the system would not block a user by evaluating a limited number of
close queries. However, if the number of queries increases, the system may detect a probable
malicious attack.
In [27], authors proposed generating adversarial examples based on perturbing one pixel
of an image through differential evolution. Although this method could fool almost all CNN
models due to the inherent features of differential evolution, there is no limit to the number of
queries to attack the model. Papernot et al. [19] proposed a practical approach for generating
adversarial examples based on Jacobian-based dataset augmentation technique to obtain new
synthetic training samples. After having an adequate number of samples and corresponding
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labels, they train a local model and apply a white-box attack (such as FGSM) on this
locally trained model to generate adversarial examples. They use the transferability property
of ML algorithms [20]. Transferability is a property that enables us to apply adversarial
examples generated by a model on another model with the same or different architecture.
The applicability of such attacks mainly revolves around the transferability property of ML
models and having enough large datasets for training the local model. Recently, Hosseini et
al. [28] proposed a three-step null labeling method to block the transferability property of
the ML models. In the first step, they train the model based on clean data, then add some
perturbations to the input data, and based on some threshold and probability functions, and
they assign the label ‘Null’ to the perturbed image. Then, they retrain the model with clean
and new adversarial examples with null labels. This approach enables the model to detect
the input adversarial examples by predicting as a ‘Null’. The previous black-box attacks try
to generate adversarial examples based on a white-box approach. In other words, they train
a local fake model, then apply a white-box attack to generate adversarial examples.
Some black-box approaches are not based on the white-box approaches. In [24], the
effectiveness of restricting the search for adversarial images to a low-frequency domain has
been investigated. After focusing on the lower frequency subspace, they randomly perturb
the components while restricting the perturbation level. It can be described as adding a
low-filtered random noise to the legitimate image. This approach could outperform many
black-box attacks. Y. Sharma et al. [25] used discrete cosine transform (DCT) dictionary to
map the image into the frequency domain. Then they put a hard threshold for choosing LoF
components. After transformation into the frequency domain, most of the frequency components have small values, and only a few have large values. This property of the frequency
domain is well known as a sparse representation of an image. Then, by applying perturbations on the LoF components, they could generate faster and more transferable adversarial
examples. This approach can completely bypass most of the top-placing defense strategies
at the NeurIPS 2017 competition. The authors also investigated the effect of perturbation
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on high frequency (HiF) components, but their results show that LoF components are the
ones that mostly affect CNN models. We were motivated by the aforementioned work and
used DCT dictionary to transfer images into the sparse (frequency) domain. Then, instead
of putting a hard threshold for choosing only k LoF components, we selected k LaS components where some low, middle, and high-frequency components are picked up. In section
1.2.1, we show the difference between LaS and LoF components.
Focusing on LaS components has been used in many image processing and compression
techniques. The JPEG codec [29] takes advantage of this property in order to compress
the images. Because the most critical features and information of an image are available in
the LaS components and not just LoF components [29]. Intuitively, image classifiers mostly
consider specific components that bear more image information. We verify this property of
image classifiers by implementing systematic experiments (section 1.2.2). We propose adding
noise to LaS components in two scenarios. In the first scenario, we randomly perturb LaS
components, and by restricting the perturbation level, the number of required queries to fool
the state-of-the-art classifiers is evaluated. Our experiment results show that the proposed
approach can fool the classifiers with fewer queries compared to the very recent approach,
which works based on LoF components [25]. In the second scenario, a directed attack, we
suppose a few images from each class are available. Given a legitimate image, we perturb
its LaS components in the direction of the most correlated sparse sample from a different
class. Our experiments show that this method can successfully fool the state-of-the-art CNN
classifiers.
In this chapter, the summary of our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce a black-box approach to generate adversarial examples in the sparse
domain to fool the ML algorithms such as CNN models, support vector machine (SVM)
classifiers, object detection algorithm (YOLOv5), and model trained by the Google
Cloud Vision API.
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• In contrast to the recent black-box attacks that focused on LoF components, we show
that the LaS components can fool the classifiers with fewer queries.
• We proposed an analytical approach to show the relationship between the perturbation
level in the sparse domain and its effect on the pixel domain. Our results show that
the proposed method decreases the number of required queries to fool the ML models
and increases the misclassification rate of ML models.

1.2

Sparsity
Sparsity has been widely used in many applications such as image denoising, deblurring,

super-resolution, and compression [30, 31]. An image signal X ∈ Rp×q can be reshaped to a
vector x ∈ RN=p×q where N is the number of pixels. Dictionary D ∈ RN×L is a matrix which
linear combination of its columns di can approximately represent the x as follows:

x=

X

si di = Ds

(1.3)

i∈{1,2,..L}

where s ∈ RL is the weight vector. If D provides a weight vector with only k large and l − k
negligible or zero elements, then D and s can be called as a sparsifying dictionary and sparse
representation of input x, respectively. For brevity, by the rest of this work, we omit the
’sparsifying’ and refer to the dictionary as a sparsifying dictionary. There are some fixed
dictionaries based on analytical approaches such as Fourier or wavelet transform which can
be designed very fast. In this work, we used DCT dictionary which is an orthonormal matrix
(D ∈ RN×N and ||di ||2 = 1). The coefficients of DCT dictionary can be obtained as follows:

π(2i − 1)(j − 1)
di,j = ai,j cos
2N

q


 1 j =1
N
ai,j = q


 2 j=
̸ 1
N

i, j ∈ 1, 2, ... , N
(1.4)
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where di,j corresponds to the entry of ith row and jth column of DCT dictionary. If we
transfer an image into the DCT domain, zeroing small components will have negligible effects
on the visual information of the image. For example, Fig. 1.1 illustrates this property. The
original image was transferred into the sparse domain via DCT dictionary and forced 70%,
80%, and 90% of its small components to zero then transformed back into the pixel domain.
Reconstructed images based on only 30%, 20%, or 10% of its LaS components can still
preserve lots of visual information of the image.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 1.1: Transferring image into the sparse domain and zeroing small elements of sparse
signal: (a) original image, (b) zeroing 70%, (c) 80%, and (d) 90% of small elements.

1.2.1 Difference Between LaS and LoF Components
The sparse domain enables us to access the important frequency components of an image. Components may belong to low, middle, or high-frequency bands. Regardless of the
frequency bands, if we choose some top-ranked components, those specific components can
8

Table 1.1: The effect of keeping only 50% or 30% of LaS, LoF, and HiF components on the
accuracy of six CNN models(%).
Model
MobileNets
ResNet50
DenseNet121
InceptionV3
Efficient-B0
Efficient-B1

Ground Truth Accuracy
(All components)
90.72
91.37
92.29
93.27
94.30
95.46

50% of
LaS
89.14
90.73
91.27
92.6
93.83
94.78

30% of
LaS
83.75
87.59
88.05
90.32
90.59
91.06

50% of
LoF [24] & [25]
77.14
79.30
79.76
80.83
79.07
80.25

30% of
LoF [24] & [25]
76.27
73.29
77.84
79.40
70.57
75.85

50% of
HiF [25]
29.79
20.89
26.31
31.42
36.54
37.36

30% of
HiF [25]
15.71
16.13
16.74
25.93
27.16
29.47

belong to any frequency band. Some images may have some information in the middle or
even higher frequencies; as a result, they would have LaS components corresponding to the
middle or higher frequencies.
To evaluate the intersection level between LaS and LoF components, we used 10000 color
images of size 256x256 pixels. The images had three color channels, and we mapped each
channel into the sparse domain separately. Then we selected N = k× k× 3 LaS and LoF
components. For chosen k = 8, k = 16, and k = 32, the number of components are N = 192,
N = 768, N = 3072, respectively. Figure 1.2 shows how many non-intersecting components
are available between LaS and LoF components. For k = 8, the mean of non-intersecting
components is 77, i.e., more than 40% of the LaS components belong to the middle or higher
frequencies components. For k = 16 and k = 32 the mean of non-intersecting components are
229 and 983, i.e., 39% and 32% of the LaS components do not belong to the low-frequency
space. This experiment shows that the LaS components do not completely overlap with
the LoF components, and some critical information of the image signals may belong to
the middle or high-frequency bands. In other words, for every image, different bands have
different information; as a result, we cannot limit the critical information of an image to
only its low-frequency space. In the next section, we evaluate the effects of manipulating
different frequency bands on the performance of CNN models.
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Figure 1.2: The number of non-intersecting components of each image.
1.2.2 Effect of LaS Components on CNN Models
Sparse transformation enables us to compact the signal’s energy into a few components.
On the other hand, many image classifiers work based on pixel domain and they do not
directly consider the sparse domain. A question that may arise here is: “how much can
manipulating LaS, LoF, or HiF components affect classifiers’ performance?”. This chapter
empirically shows that the LaS components are the most important part of images that affect
the classifiers’ performance. Our experiment was implemented over six state-of-the-art CNN
models namely, EfficientNet-B0 and B1 [32], ResNet50 [33], InceptionV3 [34], MobileNets
[35], and DenseNet121 [36].
We used the CIFAR-10 dataset, a color and balanced image dataset with a complex
background. This dataset contains 50000 training samples and 10000 test samples belonging
to 10 classes. We trained these models with 50000 training samples, and then we input the
original 10000 test samples (without any changes or manipulation) to obtain the ground
truth accuracy of each trained model (Table I). In the next step, via DCT dictionary, we
transferred all 10000 test samples into the sparse domain. Then we kept 50% and 30% of
LaS, LoF, and HiF components and zeroed the rest of the components. We transformed each

10

image back to the pixel domain and input them into the same trained model. To further
clarify, after putting these thresholds, we obtained 6 test datasets, two for Las components,
two for LoF components, and two for HiF components.
As shown in Table 1.1, the accuracies belonging to LaS components test datasets are
much closer to their corresponding ground truth accuracies. While keeping only LoF or HiF
components leads to a considerable loss of accuracy. It shows that if we only focus on LoF
or HiF components; we lose some components that affect the decision boundaries of CNN
models. For example, Efficient-B1, one of the best image classifiers introduced by Google
in 2019, has an accuracy of 95.46% for the original test dataset. If we keep only 50% of
LaS components, the accuracy is almost the same 94.78%. If we keep 50% of LoF and HiF
components, the accuracies are 80.25% and 37.36%, respectively. To elucidate, only 50% of
LaS components affect classifiers, and the other 50% components do not affect the accuracy
much.
This experiment helps us determine which frequency components mainly affect the CNN
models. By having this information, we would be able to add perturbation on important
components to fool image classifiers. Also, this experiment verified the results of [25] that
showed the importance of LoF vs. HiF components. They concluded that perturbing LoF
components is more effective than perturbing HiF components. For brevity, we omitted the
results of our experiments over other CNN models and different threshold levels, which had
the same results to verify our assumption. We release our code publicly for reproducibility.
In the next section, we add a limited perturbation to LaS and LoF components to see which
of them can fool the classifiers in fewer queries.

1.3

Perturbing LaS Components
There is no prior information about the model’s parameters and distribution of the train-

ing dataset in the adaptive black-box attack, yet the attacker can query the label of legitimate
sample and corresponding perturbed sample. However, if the number of queries increases,
11

the system may identify malicious activity. An adversarial attack is more practical if it fools
classifiers in fewer queries. We designed a systematic experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of adding perturbation on LaS components. Our results demonstrate that the proposed
approach requires fewer queries to fool image classifiers. In this experiment, six CNN models
(EfficientNet-B0 and B1, ResNet50, InceptionV3, MobileNets, DenseNet121) were used. We
trained all models with 50000 training samples of the CIFAR-10 dataset. We used 10000
test samples of the CIFAR-10 dataset that had never been used in the training process to
apply the attacks. We utilized the DCT dictionary to transfer test samples into the frequency domain. We used a Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance 1 to generate noise,
and to have a fair comparison with [25], we defined the MSE less than 0.001 as a successful
attack. We compared adding noise to k = 8 LaS and LoF components. In Fig. 3.6, the
histograms of the required number of queries to successfully fool the aforementioned CNN
models are demonstrated. The distributions of successful attacks show that manipulating
LaS components can fool the CNN models in fewer queries. Figure 1.4 shows the number
of all misclassified images in query less or equal to 10. This experiment first evaluated the
models’ prediction for each legitimate sample. If a model predicted a legitimate sample
wrongly, we put aside that sample and did not involve it in the experiment (because it was
already misclassified). Hence, the number of misclassified images in Fig. 3.6 and 1.4 are
only due to the perturbation on samples.

1.4

Case Study: Directed Perturbation
This section proposes a method for adding noise to the LaS components to fool the model

into a specific direction. In the black-box approach, the attacker can use some samples that
have never been used for the training stage. Then, the attacker can verify or find the
input sample’s label by observing the output of the objective model. This section assumes
the attacker can have multiple samples of each class and its labels. Suppose the available
dataset is X = {xi }i=p
i=1 which contains p samples and each sample belongs to one class out of
12

m available classes, i.e., C (xi ) ∈ {cj }j=m
j=1 . We map all samples of the dataset into the sparse
domain via DCT dictionary D. Doing so, S = {si }i=p
i=1 would be obtained where si is the
sparse representation of the xi . In the sparse domain, we keep the k LaS components and
force the rest of the components to zero. Then each sparse vector is normalized. Doing so,
we would have

Ŝ = {ŝi }i=p
i=1 , ||ŝi ||0 = k, ||ŝi ||2 = 1

(1.5)

where ||.||0 is the zero-norm of a vector which counts the number of non-zero elements of
a vector. Sparse vector ŝi contains information of the positions and normalized values of
the k largest elements of si which belong to class C (si ). Then for a given (ŝi , C (si )), we
find the most correlated sparse vector (ŝj , C (sj ) ̸= C (si )). In other words, sparse vector ŝj is
the closest sparse vector to the ŝi , but they belong to different classes. We used the inner
product of two vectors ⟨ŝi , ŝj ⟩ to calculate the correlation. If we change the k most important
elements of ŝi with respect to the k most important elements of ŝj , some information and
features of ŝj can be transferred into the ŝi . If some nonzero elements of ŝi and ŝj have the
same positions and close values, there is no need to change or manipulate them. Because
they have common information and changing them cannot help for fooling classifier and
may bring unnecessary perturbation in the pixel domain. To prevent this probable issue, we
subtract these two vectors to obtain the difference dij as follows:

dij = ŝi − ŝ j

(1.6)

Then, we subtract a multiplier of dij from the original sparse vector si to obtain sparse
adversarial example e
si as follows:

e
si = si − δdij

(1.7)
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where δ is a scalar number that controls the level of directed perturbation. Then, we transfer
back the adversarial sparse vector e
si to the pixel domain via dictionary D as follows:
e
xi = De
si

(1.8)

where e
xi is the adversarial example. Since the response of ML classifier for sj is C (sj ), when
we add the elements of ŝj to the ŝi , the classifier may be fooled. By choosing δ and k
properly, ML classifiers can be fooled. Two scalar parameters k and δ control the level of
perturbation. When we increase these scalars, the level of perturbation in the pixel domain
and misclassification rate would be increased accordingly. Two error metrics to compare
the adversarial image quality with the legitimate image are the Mean Square Error (MSE)
and the Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR). The MSE yields the cumulative squared error
between the adversarial and the legitimate image, whereas PSNR gives a measure of the
peak error. The higher the value of PSNR, the higher the quality.

MSE =

||xi − e
xi ||22
N


PSNR = 10 log10

h2
MSE

(1.9)

(1.10)

where h is the maximum fluctuation in the input image data type. For example, since we
normalized all image datasets to [0,1], input images’ pixels fluctuate between zero and one,
so h=1. Before investigating the relation between misclassification rate and quality metrics,
we recall two important properties of the matrix-vector multiplications; first, the product of
an orthonormal matrix by a vector does not change the norm-2 of that vector, and second, a
scalar number can take out of the norm-2 of a vector. With respect to these two properties,
since ||xi − e
xi ||22 = ||δDdij ||22 and due to the fact that the dictionary D is an orthonormal
dictionary and the δ is a scalar value, ||xi − e
xi ||22 = δ 2 ||dij ||22 . Equation (1.9) can be further
simplified to obtain a more straightforward relation between δ and MSE or PSNR in pixel
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Table 1.2: Comparing misclassification rates of directed attack over six CNN models based
on proposed method (LaS) and recent method (LoF).
Model
MobileNets
ResNet50
DenseNet121
InceptionV3
Efficient -B0
Efficient-B1

k=
LaS
19.7
21.9
20.0
16.4
16.1
13.7

20
LoF
19.3
21.8
19.2
15.3
15.6
13.1

k=
LaS
22.3
24.2
22.3
17.9
18.8
15.5

30
LoF
21.5
23.9
20.8
16.7
17.7
14.7

k=
LaS
23.6
25.6
23.4
18.4
20.2
16.9

40
LoF
22.9
25.3
22.3
17.3
19.6
15.8

domain as follows:

MSE =

δ2
2δ 2
δ2
||dij ||22 = ||ŝi − ŝj ||22 =
(1 − ⟨ŝi , ŝj ⟩)
N
N
N

(1.11)

where ⟨·, ·⟩ is the inner product operation of two vectors. Since both ŝi and ŝj are normalized
vectors, their inner product equals a number belongs to [−1, 1]. Hence MSE can be bounded
0 ≤ MSE ≤

4δ 2
.
N

However, as we choose the two most correlated sparse vectors, their inner

product is usually greater than zero. Hence, the upper bound of MSE may be smaller, i.e.
0 ≤ MSE ≤

2δ 2
.
N

This inequality shows how adding perturbation in the sparse domain can

be reflected in the perturbation in the pixel domain. The value of the δ directly affects the
MSE. The order of sparsity, k, only affects the inner product.
We applied the directed attack over the same six CNN models and compared the effectiveness of adding noise to the LaS components against adding noise to the LoF components.
In this experiment, we used multiple values for {k = 20, 30, 40}, and we fixed the value of δ
in order to have MSE ≤ 0.001. Table 1.2 shows the results and superiority of manipulating
LaS components.
As theoretically was discussed, changing δ can directly affect the perturbation level. To
show this property, we trained the LeNet network [37] with 60000 training samples of MNIST
dataset and achieved the accuracy of 98.2%, which means 1.8% misclassification rate over
10000 test samples. Then, we used the same test dataset and selected 6 different values
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for the δ and k. It leads to running 36 times, all combinations of δ and k to generate
the corresponding perturbed test dataset. Then we input all these 36 adversarial sets to the
LeNet classifier to observe the network’s response. Figure 1.5 illustrates the effect of δ and k,
PSNR, and misclassification rate of LeNet network. The left and right y-axes show the PSNR
value the misclassification rate of each perturbed dataset, respectively. Solid blue lines show
that PSNR decreases as delta value increases, and dash lines show that the misclassification
rate increases as we increase the value of δ. We also evaluated the effectiveness of our
proposed attack on the SVM classifier. Due to the computational limitation, we only used
15000 training and 3000 test samples of the MNIST dataset. After trying multiple kernels,
the polynomial kernel was the best kernel to achieve the highest score for the classification.
The misclassification rate of the trained SVM classifier on the benign test dataset was 5%.
Then we generated adversarial sets with different levels of perturbation. Figure 1.6 shows
that the SVM classifier is highly vulnerable to the proposed attack.
We compared our approach with recent work by Papernot et al. [19] which is not based
on frequency domain. We used the Cleverhans library [38], and to have a fair comparison,
the same CNN and parameters were used. We trained the network 10 times, and after each
time, the misclassification rate of the trained model on both adversarial sets was recorded.
Figure 1.7 shows that for δ =15 and k = 20, our proposed adversarial examples have a higher
misclassification rate than that of the previous work, while our method has a higher PSNR
which means less perceptible perturbation.

1.5

Attacking Google Cloud Vision and YOLO
To evaluate the realistic threat of LaS components perturbation, we attacked a popu-

lar online machine learning service, Google Cloud Vision. The platform provides a TFLite
version that can be deployed over Android operating systems. We used a high-resolution
dataset which contained 20,938 samples belonging to 10 animals “spider, dog, cat, squirrel,
sheep, butterfly, horse, elephant, cow, chicken” [39]. Figure 1.8 shows the details of the
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trained model by Google Cloud Vision. To assess the effectiveness of our proposed attack,
we downloaded its TFLite version. We randomly selected 500 test samples and added perturbation based on LaS and LoF approaches. By adding limited noise to LaS components,
132 out of 500 samples were misclassified. Also, adding noise to LoF components led to 129
misclassified samples. Figure 1.9 shows the number of required queries to fool the TFlite
model based on both methods. In addition, Fig. 1.10 shows three samples and corresponding adversarial examples for MSE values equal to 0.001, 0.002, and 0.005. The first column
shows the legitimate samples that are classified correctly by the classifier, the second column
from the left that is closed by a green box, belongs to the adversarial examples with MSE =
0.001, the other two columns with red boxes related to the adversarial examples with MSE
= 0.002 and 0.005. As defined in [25], we set the threshold of MSE≤ 0.001 as a successful
attack.
In addition, we applied our attack over an object detection algorithm. Object detection
has been widely used by autonomous vehicles and biomedical devices. One of the fastest
and most accurate object detection algorithms is YOLOv5 [40]. YOLOv5 is a one-stage
algorithm that implements classification and regression tasks in a single step. Object detection algorithms implement two tasks, detection and classification. If the model fails to
detect the object correctly, it may cause irreversible consequences in certain sensitive applications. In this experiment, we used International Skin Imaging Collaboration (ISIC)-2017
skin lesion dataset that contains 2000 training samples, 150 validation samples, and 600 test
samples belonging to three skin lesion classes: melanoma, nevus, and seborrheic keratosis.
We resized the input samples into 640x640 pixels and set two parameters as Intersection over
Union (IoU) to 0.50 and confidence threshold to 0.25. We trained the model and evaluated
its performance over 600 test samples. Figure 1.11 shows the performance of the trained
model over test dataset. Precision measures how accurate the predictions are, while recall
measures how well the model finds all the positive cases.
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IoU measures the overlap between the predicted box around the object with the ground
truth. The model achieved mean Average Precision (mAP) equal to 0.72 over three classes.
In the next step, we randomly selected some test samples that had never been used in the
training process to add perturbation and observe the model response. Our results show that
by adding limited noise to the LaS components, this model predicts wrong labels with high
confidence scores. In Fig. 1.12, we only showed a few adversarial examples that had been
misclassified. However, the model had adversarial samples that could not detect any object.
In this experiment, we set MSE≤ 0.001 to generate adversarial examples. We released our
code, the TFlite model trained by Google Cloud Vision, the trained object detection model,
and the annotation files of ISIC-2017 dataset publicly for reproducibility [41].

1.6

Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a new approach for generating adversarial examples in the

sparse domain. We show that LaS components differ from LoF components, and they belong
to all frequency bands (low, middle, or high). We proposed a hypothesis that LaS components
affect the decision boundaries of CNN models much more than LoF components. This
hypothesis was the key to building our proposed adversarial method.
We designed a systematic experiment to support this hypothesis. By running experiments
over six advanced CNN models, we empirically verified that LaS components affect the
decision boundaries of CNN models more than LoF components. Then we added a limited
noise to the LaS components to generate our proposed adversarial example. We evaluated the
response of six advanced CNN models against our adversarial examples and compared them
with recent work. Our results over MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets unanimously support
this hypothesis that adversarial examples generated based on manipulating LaS components
can fool the CNN models in fewer queries than the LoF approach.
We also implemented our experiments over Animal and skin lesion ISIC-2017 datasets
to evaluate Google Cloud Vision API and YOLO algorithm. Results show the effectiveness
18

of our proposed method to fool the models mentioned above. By introducing the potential
threat within this type of attack, an appropriate defense mechanism can be investigated in
the future. Moreover, we used a DCT dictionary to transfer images into the sparse domain.
However, there are many other ways to transfer an image into a sparse domain other than
the DCT domain that can be further investigated.
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Figure 1.3: Comparing the required number of queries to fool CNN models based on
proposed approach (LaS), and LoF.
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Figure 1.4: Comparing number of misclassified samples for query less or equal to 10 based
on LaS and LoF.
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Figure 1.7: Comparing the misclassification rate of proposed method of perturbation and
recent practical black-box (BBX) approach.

Figure 1.8: Information of dataset and trained model by Google Cloud Vision.
22

Figure 1.9: Comparing the required number of queries to fool a TFlite model trained by
GoogleAPI based on proposed approach (LaS), and LoF.

Figure 1.10: Samples of attacking Google Cloud Vision.
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Figure 1.11: Performance of YOLOv5 over skin lesion dataset (ISIC-2017).

Figure 1.12: Samples of attacking the object detection algorithm (YOLOv5).
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Chapter 2: Improving the Performance of Deep Learning Models

The skin lesion is one of the severe diseases, in many cases, endanger the lives of patients
to a worldwide extent. Early detection of disease in dermoscopy images can significantly
increase the survival rate. However, the accurate detection of disease is highly challenging
due to the following reasons: e.g. visual similarity between different classes of disease (e.g.,
melanoma and non-melanoma lesions), low contrast between lesions and skin, background
noise, and artifacts 2 .
Machine learning models based on convolutional neural networks (CNN) have been widely
used to automatically recognize lesion diseases with high accuracy compared to conventional
machine learning methods.
In this research, we proposed a new preprocessing technique in order to extract the RoI
of the skin lesion dataset. We compare the performance of the most state-of-the-art CNN
classifiers with two datasets which contain (1) raw and (2) RoI extracted images. Our
experiment results show that training CNN models by RoI extracted dataset can improve
the prediction accuracy (e.g., InceptionResNetV2, 2.18% improvement). Moreover, it also
significantly decreases the evaluation (inference) and training time of classifiers.

2.1

Introduction
With the growing advance of deep learning, numerous tasks have been solved by Artifact

Intelligence (AI). Especially, the demand for AI for medical images has become emerging
in recent years since, with the early detection of the disease, we can now provide better
treatment plans. However, the main issue related to medical image classification is insuffi2

This chapter was published in Medical Biological Engineering Computing [4]. Permission is included
in Appendix A.
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cient image samples. Skin is the largest organ of the body that contains lots of information
about the individual’s health condition, and also their identity [42]. The skin lesion is a
serious disease that may lead to detrimental consequences if it does not diagnose in a proper
time. There are many sources for skin image datasets, among them, the International Skin
Imaging Collaboration (ISIC) provides public datasets that are mainly used for skin lesion
classification [43, 44, 45, 46, 47]. Image segmentation is one of the most important computer
vision tasks to partition an image into multiple segments. The main aim of segmentation
is to locate objects of interest and its boundary to enable more efficient and effective further analysis. Segmentation has been widely investigated and implemented in many works
[48, 49, 50].
There are many machine learning methods for object segmentation. One of the wellknown methods for object semantic segmentation tasks is U-Net [51]. The network can be
trained on both the original and augmented dataset in this method. This characteristic
is primarily appropriate when the target datasets are from medical fields (mostly limited)
since data augmentation enriches training samples. Also in [52], residual multitasking network achieved second place (among 28 teams) in ISBI 2016 Skin Lesion Analysis Towards
Melanoma Detection Challenge segmentation task [44]. This model includes more than
50 layers with residual layers, separated into two sub-architectures for classification and
segmentation. Another promising method, namely fully convolutional network (FCNs), is
introduced by [53]. This deep neural architect aims to localize the coarse approximation in
the early learning stage; then, the exact approximation will be learned later. Besides, the
author also introduced a fusion framework to facilitate their model’s performance. The final
model achieved 90.66% in the PH2 dataset and 91.18% in ISIC-2016.
In [54], an end-to-end training procedure has been proposed that utilizes the Jaccard Distance loss. The model includes 19 layers trained thoroughly by their proposed loss function.
Although the result is not outstanding for more challenging samples (involving hairs, badges,
poor lightning condition, etc.), their approach outperforms the [44] and [53] within the same
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datasets. The first attempt towards multi-class segmentation on ISBI 2016 was conducted
by [55], enabling segmentation with classes’ information. The sequential learning method
involved Faster-RCNN and U-Net in [56] also tackles the same segmentation task. In [57]
a fully resolution convolutional network for learning visual representation from skin lesion
images, reaching 77.11% Jaccard Index on ISIC-2017 private test set has been proposed.
In this study, we investigated the effectiveness of ROI extraction after the segmentation
step to improve the performance of the classification task. We have experimented and
evaluated recently developed methods of semantic segmentation so as to isolate and extract
the RoI (lesion) of the images. It enables us to remove unwanted background pixels and
artifacts such as hairs and badges before training CNN models.

2.2

Material and Method
We started our study with a lightweight non-training-based segmentation method, then

to have a better result, we extended our study by implementing a complex training-based
segmentation method. One of the non-training-based segmentation algorithms that we investigated is Otsu’s thresholding [58] which clusters the background (skin) and the foreground
(lesions) based on the optimal threshold from the histogram of the pixel counts. Several previous works utilize Otsu’s thresholding segmentation due to its simplicity, for example, H&E
staining images [59], MRI and CT scan images [60], and also melanoma lesions detection
[61]. However, the main assumption of this segmentation method relies on the histogram of
pixel counts, which is assumed to be bimodal distribution. Hence, the performance of Otsu’s
segmentation on noisy images that possess badges, hairs, and black borders is unsatisfactory.
The second approach for non-training-based segmentation is K-means clustering based
on the color spaces [62]. The unsupervised cluster took three inputs: (1) two components of
three color spaces: Hue which is related to the color’s position on a color wheel. Cr and Cb
are the blue-difference and red-difference chroma components of an image, (2) pixel-based
features and (3) rough estimation of skin’s boundary gained from the color-based classifier.
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In both segmentation algorithms, we have used the Jaccard index for evaluating segmentation
performance as follows:

J(A, B) =

|A ∩ B|
|A ∪ B|

(2.1)

where A corresponds to the ground truth binary segmentation mask, B represents the predicted binary segmentation mask, |A ∩ B| is the area of overlap, and |A ∪ B| is the area of
union [63]. We used ISIC-2017, which contains 2000 skin lesion samples with 2000 corresponding masks as ground truth, to evaluate the performance of these two algorithms [64].
Although the K-means clustering method was well-performed than Otsu’s thresholding segmentation by having a Jaccard Index of 76.2% compared to 71.7%, it can still not eliminate
artifacts efficiently. However, our experiments over the skin dataset showed that both nontraining-based approaches could not segment images very well since artifacts like badges are
more often than not segmented as skin lesions. In addition, the K-means approach does not
consider the region’s border. We observed that ground truth masks of the skin lesions are
mostly solid closed-contour shape. However, the K-means approach does not give a solid
shape. In other words, there are some small dark regions inside a detected lesion contour.
This issue is because the algorithm tries to separate pixels into multiple clusters based on
the mean, regardless of the position and value of near pixels. Figure 1 shows two samples of
the ISIC-2017 that have been segmented based on the K-means approach. The red circles
inside the lesion contour show the disability of this approach for detecting the whole lesion
part.
To address this issue, and regarding the availability of 2000 masks of ISIC-2017, we
followed our investigation by evaluating training-based approaches. One of the most common
training-based approaches for image segmentation is “U-net” convolutional neural network
[51]. U-net architecture is an evolution of the traditional convolutional neural network, which
is a so-called end-to-end fully convolutional network (FCN). The architecture includes two
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Figure 2.1: Results of K-means segmentation, from left to right: (1) raw image, (2) ground
truth segmentation (3) segmented image.
parts: (1) the contraction path (the encoder) and (2) the symmetric expanding path (the
decoder).
The encoder is a conventional CNN, a sequence of matrix operations (convolutional layers,
max pooling, batch normalization, and so on). The main modification from conventional
CNN is lied on the decoder - successive expanding path, where the upsampling operator
is used instead of pooling operation. Thus, the resolution of outputs increases along with
these layers. The features from the encoder are then combined with upsampled output to
enable precise localization. Since fully connected layers are absent from U-net architecture,
the network’s outputs are segmentation maps that represent the mask of the lesion in the
corresponding image.
By using the train data (images and their corresponding masks), the FCN can segment
the lesion without segmenting artifacts as a lesion part. However, the database for training
segmentation task is rarely available since it requires the expertise of related fields. Medical
segmentation tasks often involve objects with varying size, ranging from cell nuclei [51], lung
[65], retina vessels [66], and tumors [67]. Especially in dermoscopy images, the RoI often
results in irregular shapes and varying sizes. Thus, the demand for a stable network that is
robust to a wide scale of image sizes is necessary for further analysis. In this work, we have
adopted the state-of-the-art MultiResUNet architecture, which integrated the idea of Residual Inception blocks [68]. By utilizing multiple kernels with different sizes in parallel fashion,
29

Figure 2.2: RoI extraction process: black texts show target images and its size, and red
texts illustrate corresponding method used at each stage of the process.
the MultiResUNet outperforms the conventional U-Net architecture by 5.065% in skin lesion
boundary segmentation. Our experimental results show that the MultiResUNet segmentation network overcomes both Otsu’s thresholding and K-means segmentation method due to
its strong suit built on expertise-involved training data. Within the scope of this paper, we
used ISIC-2017 [64] database for skin lesion boundary segmentation. The MultiResUNet is
trained by 2000 images along with corresponding masks produced by dermoscopic experts
from ISIC-2017. We then selected the best segmentation model with the Jaccard Index of
80.4 for segmenting 23331 remaining images of ISIC-2019.

2.2.1 RoI Extraction
The image sizes of the skin lesion dataset are various and large. Due to the computational
limitations of CNN models, the input/output layers’ size of the segmentation model are fixed
and smaller than that of the raw image. For example, in Fig. 2 and Fig.3 first and second
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Figure 2.3: Results of MultiResUNet segmentation, from left to right: (1) raw image, (2)
segmented image, and (3) RoI extracted image.
rows, the raw image size is 682×1024×3, 1024×768×3, and 1024×682×3 pixels, respectively.
But the size of the input/output layers of the segmentation model is fixed to 224×224 pixels.
It means, regardless of the raw image’s size, the output segmented image’s size is 224×224×3
pixels. Moreover, by observing the segmented images in Fig. 3, it is obvious that many
pixels are black (detected as background), and only a small number of pixels is related to
the lesion part. If we directly input segmented images to a classifier, those black pixels do
not contribute much to the classification tasks. Also, since the legion part is highly downsampled, some critical information could be lost. To verify our assumptions, we trained and
evaluated multiple CNN models based on a segmented dataset, but their accuracy was much
lower (up to 10%) than that of the raw dataset.
We developed an algorithm to extract the RoI from raw images based on derived masks
to overcome this issue. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the output mask is first resized to the same
size as the raw image, then contour’s structural analysis was applied to detect locations of
bounding rectangle box (green rectangle). After finding the rectangle of RoI, we extract this
part of the raw image and input it into the classifier. In Fig. 2.3, two samples are depicted
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to show how our approach can focus on the most important part of the skin image. This
approach can prevent to useless input pixels (black pixels) to CNN models, and the input
lesion part would have more information.
In this study, the importance of extracting RoI on the performance of the CNN-based
classifiers is investigated. While CNNs have been widely used for skin lesion classification
[69, 70, 71, 68], to the best of our knowledge, there is no work about the effect of RoI
extraction before training CNN models. In the next section, we discuss in more detail about
CNNs, followed by the experimental settings and results.

2.3

Classification

2.3.1 Transfer Learning
Unlike traditional machine learning, where an expert needs to observe the target and
extract good reliable features based on his knowledge, deep learning methods automatically
extract reliable, high-quality features from large amounts of targets, making them more
beneficial than traditional methods. Consequently, deep learning methods highly depend on
mass data since they need a large amount of data to have a reliable comprehension of the
patterns of the data set. The more data set a deep learning network has, the bigger it should
be to extract well-behaved features. It means that to achieve an outstanding performance
from a deep neural network, it needs a large amount of data that requires an extensive
network to understand its patterns.
In deep neural networks, some of the final layers are responsible for making a decision
related to the task, and the rest of them can be used to extract high-level features. Lack
of sufficient data is one of the main problems that researchers usually face when training a
model on specific data. This problem can be more severe in biomedical image classification
tasks since it is much harder to find a large amount of a high-quality data set. Transfer
learning addresses this problem and is a solution. In traditional machine learning, we should
consider that training data must be independent and identically distributed with the test
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data. However, transfer learning assumes that training and test data do not need to be
independent and identically distributed entries. It means that for a specific task, the network
is not required to train from scratch, which has two specific benefits, first, it eliminates the
requirement of accessing a big dataset, and second, it reduces the time of training the
network.
CNN pre-trained models are usually trained on large image classification tasks. Convolutional layers are responsible for extracting high-level features from an image, while dense
layers must decide on those features. There are two kinds of transfer learning: feature
extraction and fine-tuning. In the former, the convolutional layer parameters are frozen
during back-propagation and are used to extract features on a new data set, and the new
dense layer is added to fit the network for the new data set. After adding a new dense
layer, relax back-propagation will be done on the whole parameters for tuning them with
the new dataset. Pre-trained models by ImageNet have been widely used for skin lesion
classification[72, 73, 74]. We also tested this property and found that if we initialize the
models with ImageNet pre-trained wights, the training process converges in fewer epochs
while maintaining higher accuracy. Also, we used data augmentation by randomly rotating
the training images up to 90 degrees, and flipping them horizontally.

2.3.2 Deep Learning Models
Since 2012, when Alex Krizhevsky et al. introduced the AlexNet[75], CNN models which
were not able to absorb attention came back to the play and in the next few years, many
researchers and experts tried to come up with new deep neural networks in the similar way
to improve the accuracy on different tasks[76, 32, 77, 34, 78, 36, 33, 79]. We have used some
of these pre-trained networks via transfer learning in our work to evaluate the effectiveness of
our proposed method. We have used InceptionResNetV2[76], Xception[77], InceptionV3[34],
DenseNet[36], ResNet-152[33], and VGG19[79] which each of them has different architecture
in the number of fully connected layers and convolutional layers.
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These artificial models have tried to look at different problems and are designed by some
experts since it requires a suitable selection of architectures that need high-quality knowledge
in machine learning, as well as it is a tedious and time-consuming task. Moreover, different
architectures should be designed for different targets to get a better result. However, some
works named the neural architecture search(NAS) have been introduced recently to address
this problem and try to find a good architecture for a certain target automatically, which is
logically suitable for different types of image classification. In our work, we also tried to use
some of these networks, which are trained well on the ImageNet data set to evaluate our work.
We have used two networks EfficientNet[32] and NasNet[78] which both are automatically
designed by Google brain team members.

2.4

Experiments and Results
We used ISIC-2019 dataset that contains 25331 dermoscopic images belong to 8 classes:

melanoma, melanocytic nevus, basal cell carcinoma, actinic keratosis, benign keratosis, dermatofibroma, vascular lesion, and squa-mous cell carcinoma. On the other hand, the ISIC2017 dataset contains 2000 samples with masks for skin lesion segmentation and classification.
These 2000 samples of ISIC-2017 are exactly available in ISIC-2019 as well. We used those
2000 samples and their masks to train the MultiResUNet model, and we did not involve
them in the evaluation. We set the input/output size of the segmentation model to 224×224
pixels. After training MultiResUNet model for 50 epochs, we generated 23331 segmented
images(2000 samples out of 25331 were excluded). The average required time for segmenting
each image was 11 milliseconds (Ms). Then, we applied our RoI extraction algorithm in
order to focus on the main information of the image. After doing so, two sets of images
were generated for our experiments: one contained 23331 raw images and the other had
23331 corresponding RoI extracted images. We randomly split the 23331 samples into three
sub-sets, training (18890 samples), validation (2101 samples), and test (2340 samples). We
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applied the same data augmentation from the Keras framework over both training datasets
by randomly rotating the images up to 90 degrees and horizontally flipping them.
Python was used as the programming language. We used Keras, a high-level neural
networks API written in Python and can run on top of TensorFlow. All models were directly
selected from Keras documentation, and the default input size of the first layer was chosen
according to the Keras documantation[80]. Keras framework provides models that can be
converted to TensorFlow lite (TFLite) format. TFLite models can be deployed over the
android operating system. We used a single GPU (Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti with 11
GB GDDR5X memory) for all of our experiments (training and evaluation).
We have done several experiments in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the segmentation and RoI extraction before the classification. To have a fair comparison, all input
and hyperparameters were set the same for each model while training raw or segmented
datasets. We used a learning rate of 0.001, batch size 8 for the NasNet model, and batch
size 16 for the rest of the models. Default input size of each model was used (refer to Table
2.1). Each model was trained for 50 epochs and 1000 steps per epoch.
In Table 2.1, we evaluated the accuracy of each trained model over the test dataset. The
results show that extracting the RoI prior to classification can improve the accuracy of skin
lesion diagnosis. Table 2.1 only presents the results based on the default size of each network
where we obtained the best accuracy of each model. However, we trained each model with
a smaller size as well. The smaller input size gave lower accuracy but higher improvement.
Since skin lesion contains eight unbalanced classes, overall accuracy may not completely
convey the effectiveness of our approach. Hence, to evaluate the impact of our approach over
each class separately, we used an F1-score which can yield a more realistic measure of the
classifier’s performance. It avoids being misled by the average accuracy that can be wrongly
obtained from a very poor precision or very high recall. Figure 2.4 shows the F1-score of two
diseases, ’melanoma’ and ’nevus’, and also weighted-average over all classes. In this figure,
classifiers’ indices are as follows: #1: InceptionResNetV2, #2: Efficient-B7, #3: Xception,

35

Table 2.1: Effect of segmentation on the accuracy of CNN classifiers (%).
Model
InceptionResNetV2[76]
Efficient-B7[32]
Xception[77]
InceptionV3[34]
NasNet[78]
DenseNet[36]
ResNet-152[33]
Efficient-B0[32]
VGG19[79]

Input
size
299 × 299
224 × 224
299 × 299
299 × 299
331 × 331
224 × 224
224 × 224
224 × 224
224 × 224

Raw
data
86.75
84.87
86.03
87.09
85.85
85.68
84.15
81.75
80.17

RoI extracted
data
88.93
87.95
87.74
87.39
86.24
86.03
85.17
84.87
82.61

#4: InceptionV3, #5: NasNet, #6: DenseNet, #7: ResNet-152, #8: Efficient-B0, #9:
VGG19. The proposed approach can improve the performance of almost all classifiers.
In Table 2.2, the required time for predicting the label of each input sample has been
reported. It is evident that the inference time of segmented data is much lower than that of
the raw data. To have stable results, we repeated our experiments ten times over the test
dataset, and then the average of results was calculated. In Table 2.3, the required time for
training each model has been evaluated for both datasets. It shows that segmented data
can be trained in a shorter time. Although training and generating segmented images take
time, in certain cases, we generate a dataset one time and use it for training many models.
For example, in ensemble learning, many models are used to calculate the best accuracy
[81]. Using a segmented dataset would significantly decrease the time of training and, as
a result, save more power and computational resources. By using segmented images, the
required times for training all models would be decreased, but the required time for the
evaluation would be decreased accordingly. The size of the raw dataset (23331 samples)
is 9.4 GB (gigabyte), while the size of the segmented dataset is 1.4 GB. On overage, the
size of a segmented image is less than one-sixth of a raw sample. This property would be
important if we need to send the data over a communication channel. For example, in a
remote classification task, a client may send the image to a remote server for doing more
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Figure 2.4: F1-score of two classes: ’melanoma’, ’nevus’, and weighted-average of all
classes.
reliable classification. By doing a segmentation over the client-side (e.g., android device), we
would be able to reduce the communication bandwidth.

2.5

Case Study: Effect of Compression on the Performance of the Skin Lesion
Classification
Image compression is an important type of data compression applied to digital images to

decrease storage or transmission costs. Image compression may be lossless or lossy. Lossless
compression methods are preferred for archival purposes and often for medical imaging.
In many IoT resource-constrained devices, images are sent to a remote server through a
communication channel in order to apply appropriate post-processing. A straightforward
scenario is sending raw images to the server. However, it may take more bandwidth uploading
time. By applying an appropriate compression technique, we can reduce the size of the
image, thereby decreasing the upload time and required communication bandwidth. There
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Table 2.2: Effect of segmentation on the inference time of CNN classifiers (Ms ).
Model
InceptionResNetV2[76]
Efficient-B7[32]
Xception[77]
InceptionV3[34]
NasNet[78]
DenseNet[36]
ResNet-152[33]
Efficient-B0[32, 35]
VGG19[79]

Input
size
299 × 299
224 × 224
299 × 299
299 × 299
331 × 331
224 × 224
224 × 224
224 × 224
224 × 224

Raw
data
22
20
24
22
30
19
21
19
21

RoI extracted
data
12
14
10
8
23
8
11
7
9

Table 2.3: Effect of segmentation on the training time of CNN classifiers (Hours).
Model
InceptionResNetV2[76]
Efficient-B7[32]
Xception[77]
InceptionV3[34]
NasNet[78]
DenseNet[36]
ResNet-152[33]
Efficient-B0[32]
VGG19[79]

Input
size
299 × 299
224 × 224
299 × 299
299 × 299
331 × 331
224 × 224
224 × 224
224 × 224
224 × 224

Raw
data
16.2
17.4
11.8
12.8
13.3
11.4
10.5
6.5
12.7

RoI extracted
data
9.6
11.7
6.7
10.5
12.7
9.3
7.1
3.5
5.3
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are many image compression techniques; however, only a few are energy efficient and require
very limited computational resources. In this study, we suppose a resource-constrained IoT
device has generated the image, such as a smartphone; as a result, we propose using a method
to be fast, energy efficient, and deployable over IoT devices. Compression should not affect
images’ quality and image classification performance. Compressed sensing was one of the
best choices that could meet our requirements.
Compressive sensing (CS) is a sampling technique for efficiently sampling a signal by
solving under-determined linear systems. It takes advantage of the signal’s sparsity, and
fewer measurements than the Nyquist rate can effectively represent the signal. For instance,
given a vectorized image signal x ∈ R N and an orthogonal basis Ψ ∈ RN×N , then one can map
the image signal to sparse domain via, = Ψs, where ∈ RN is a sparse vector with k ( k << N)
nonzero entries. In other words, is a sparse representation of under the chosen pre-defined
dictionary. The compression phase in CS provides the measurement vector through a linear
operation as given below:

y = Φx = ΦΨs

(2.2)

where, y ∈ RM is the measurement vector and Φ ∈ RM×N is the measurement matrix. For
simplicity, let A = ΦΨ. A ∈ RM×N is a rectangular matrix, sometimes referred to as “total”
dictionary in the CS literature. For exact and stable recovery of sparse signal, restricted
isometry property (RIP) is a sufficient condition. RIP is satisfied if there exists a restricted
isometry constant (RIC) δK , 0 < δK < 1 such that

(1 − δK )∥s∥22 ≤ ∥As∥22 ≤ (1 + δK )∥s∥22

(2.3)

where δK denotes the isometry constant of a matrix A, and its value belongs to a set of real
numbers between zero and one. But, checking the RIP condition of a matrix or calculating
the value of its isometry constant is difficult to verify. Hence, conditions that lead to RIP
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were proposed. Another condition, which is easier to verify in practice, is the requirement
that measurement matrix Φ must be incoherent with the sparsity basis Ψ. Mutual coherence
µ between Φ and Ψ is defined as follows:
√
µ(Φ, Ψ) =

N max
i,j

| ⟨ϕi , ψj ⟩ |
∥ϕi ∥2 ∥ψj ∥2

(2.4)

where ϕi∈{1,...,M} and ψj∈{1,...,N} respectively represent the row vectors of Φ and the column
vectors of Ψ. The coherence measures the maximum correlation between the two matrices.
Smaller coherence can lead to better signal reconstruction performance and higher quality.
√
Since µ ∈ [ 1, N ], the matrices Φ and Ψ are incoherent if µ(Φ, Ψ) is closer to one, which
corresponds to the lower bound of µ.
A step called the recovery process reconstructs the input signal from the measurement
vector by solving the equation (2.2). Since is a rectangular matrix (M < N), the problem
formulated in equation (2.2) is ill-posed and has infinite solutions. However, based on the
knowledge that has a sparse representation regarding a basis Ψ, the recovery process can
be performed in two steps. The first step finds the sparse vector s̃ by solving the following
optimization equation. Once the vector˜has been obtained, the second step reconstructs the
original signal as follows:

x̃ = Ψs̃.

(2.5)

Various methods have been proposed to find an appropriate solution to the equation leading to numerous recovery algorithms such as Basic Pursuit, StOMP, OMP, CoSAMP, Belief
Propagation, and SL0. Compressive sensing (CS) takes advantage of the potential sparsity within signals, and through a non-adaptive linear measurement process, it can generate
compressed samples. In this approach, the compression phase is highly fast, energy-efficient.
Figure 2.5 shows one sample of skin lesion that has been compressed via compressed sensing
method for compression ratio (CR) of 4:1.
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Figure 2.5: Compressing one sample with CR = 4:1.
In the next step, we assessed the effect of compression on the performance of skin lesion
classifiers. With this regard, we compressed and sent the whole ISIC dataset to a remote
server. Then, we recovered all images and trained different CNN models to evaluate the
performance of classification tasks. Figure 2.6 shows the details of our experiments. We
compared our results with the case that there is no compression. As illustrated in Table 2.4,
if we compress images in edge devices and send them to the remote server, then making a
recovery before evaluating the ML model, it would improve the accuracy. In other words, the
compression-decompression process can reduce the noise of images, as CNN models would
be trained with less noisy data.
Furthermore, the test data would have less noise and as a result, the diagnosis would be
more precise. Also, we compared this CS-based compression with SVD-based compression
technique. Our experiments show that our proposed compression method can outperform
the SVD-based approach. As shown in Table 2.5, for a given compression ratio, CS-based
compression can maintain the accuracy much better than that of the SVD-based compression.
Figure 2.7 shows the effectiveness of using CS in terms of required computational resources in
both the client-side and server-side. We compressed and recovered 2340 skin lesion samples
based on the CS method. The average time for the compression phase is 0.004 seconds, while
the average time for recovery is 2.33 seconds. Regarding our objective of having resourceconstrained devices in clients, this experiment shows that CS can opt as a compression
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Figure 2.6: Training and testing each model with their corresponding datasets
Table 2.4: Effect of compression on the accuracy of CNN models.
Resnet-152
EfficientNet-B0
EfficientNet-B1
EfficientNet-B2
EfficientNet-B3

Raw
86.88
88.83
89.31
88.80
90.26

CR=2
87.61
88.97
89.0
89.49
89.79

CR = 4
88.59
89.10
89.61
89.23
90.30

CR = 6
87.18
88.08
89.16
88.33
89.57

CR=8
87.09
87.91
88.50
88.46
88.25

CR = 16
86.67
86.71
87.05
87.95
87.61

method. Furthermore, we compared our method with that of the SVD based compression.
The average compression time for SVD-based was 0.01 seconds which is two and half times
larger than that of CS-based compression.

2.6

Conclusion
This study proposed a new preprocessing technique to separate the RoI section from

the unwanted background of skin lesions. To this end, we used one of the state-of-the-art
segmentation algorithms, MultiResUnet, to segment the skin lesion image. Then, we found
the bounding box around the lesion and cropped that part of the image. We applied this
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Figure 2.7: Elapsed time of compression phase vs recovery phase of cs-based method

Table 2.5: Comparing different compression methods.

EfficientNet B0
EfficientNet B1

CR
CS
89.10
89.61

=4
SVD
88.59
88.33

CR=16
CS
SVD
86.71 83.72
87.05 85.00
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preprocessing over the whole ISIC-2019 except for 2000 samples of this dataset used for
training the MultiresUnet model. This preprocessing enabled us to only input the essential
part of the image to the classifiers for both training and evaluation steps. Our investigation
over different CNN models showed that if we train models with RoI extracted dataset,
the accuracy of models would be increased, and the training and inference time would be
dropped. We remove unwanted background and only input the most important part of the
skin image to the classifiers. Our results were based on Keras models in this study, and we
used ImageNet pre-trained weights to train all classifiers. We trained the models based on
their default input resolution size (based on Keras Documentation). As the discussion above
revealed, focusing on the RoI part of an image can improve the performance of skin lesion
classification. Instead of the segmentation technique, an object detection algorithm can also
be used to find the RoI of skin lesions. However, there is no available annotated dataset for
training object detection algorithms. But, converting the mask labels of ISIC-2017 to the
annotated dataset, would enable us to train an object detection algorithm. It can speed up
the RoI extraction phase and potentially improve the final accuracy of classifiers.
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Chapter 3: Lossless Privacy-Preserving Image Denoising

Image denoising aims to obtain the original image from its noisy measurements. While the
quality of image denoising has been increasing over the years, the complexity and the required
memory in order to implement the denoising task have also been increased accordingly.
Along with such advancements, and due to the unlimited computing resources available in
the cloud, trends to transfer the image denoising task to the cloud have grown over the
past years. However, it is still quite challenging to utilize cloud-based resources without
compromising users’ data privacy while maintaining the quality of image denoising. In
this chapter, we propose a novel lossless privacy-preserving image denoising approach that
protects the users’ privacy and preserves the quality of the denoising task concurrently. Our
proposed approach is suitable for computationally constrained devices such as many IoT
devices. In this method, we use two random keys to permute and perturb the noisy image
patches. The cloud service provider implements the denoising task on the encrypted signal.
After denoising, the output signal is still encrypted, and the real user who has access to the
keys would be able to decrypt the denoised image. We evaluate the security of this method
against known-plaintext, brute-force, and side-channel attacks. In addition, we theoretically
prove the lossless property of this method. To verify the applicability of this approach,
we implemented our experiments on multiple real images, and two well-known evaluation
metrics were used to compare our results with the baseline.

3.1

Introduction
With the recent advancements of the internet of things (IoT) and computing technolo-

gies, large-scale image datasets obtained from various applications such as medical imaging
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equipment, remote surveillance and traffic devices, smartphones, and satellites have been
growing. For example, in the context related to multimedia healthcare [82], images are intermittently generated from IoT-enabled and wearable medical imaging devices [83]. When
such data explosion is in high demand to store, process, and manage images via cloud resources. [84, 85]. One of the most prominent and long-standing image processing techniques
is image denoising. Noise is a ubiquitous signal that can affect any image sensing process and
degrade the image’s visual quality. In specific biomedical applications such as autonomous
skin lesion segmentation [86], nail fungus disease detection [87], or magnetic resonance imaging [88], it may cause wrong diagnosis. Also, a noisy image can mislead the state-of-the-art
deep networks deployed over autonomous vehicles by making wrong decisions [89].
The main objective of image denoising is to recover an original image from its noisy
version. In the literature, there exist numerous image denoising techniques. Among them,
Patch-based image denoising methods provide the highest quality [90, 91, 92]. In this chapter,
we consider the classic patch-based image denoising problem, which is capturing an ideal
original image I

in the presence of the additive white Gaussian noise V with standard

deviation σ [91, 92]. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the noisy measured image Y can be obtained as
follows.

Y =I +V

(3.1)

Restoring accurate I from Y is a challenging problem, i.e., zeroing as much noise as possible while preserving the visual details in Y . A common approach to implement an effective
denoising algorithm is generating noisy image patches. For this purpose, an overlapped sliding window (solid red color window) is used to generate all possible noisy patches (Fig. 3.1).
One of the well-known approaches for patched-based image denoising is K-singular value
decomposition (K-SVD) [92]. This algorithm takes advantage of image patches’ sparsity to
restore the noisy image.
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Figure 3.1: Classic patch-based image denoising problem.
Over the years, other denoising methods based on supervised deep-learning [93, 94, 95,
96, 97] [93, 94], EPLL [98], BM3 D [99], WNNM [100] could surpass the K-SVD method.
However, very recently, deep K-SVD denoising was proposed by Scetbon et al.[90] and could
outperform the state-of-the-art denoising algorithms. They trained a deep model with the
same K-SVD computational path in order to obtain optimized denoising. In other words,
they try to use deep architecture to train a few parameters so as to improve the K-SVD
approach.
While the quality of denoising has been increasing over the years, the complexity and the
required memory to execute denoising processes have been increased accordingly[90]. For
example, given a noisy image, thousands of patches of that image should be generated to
input the denoising algorithm [90]. Also, many of the current methods use a deep architecture
which requires a strong enough processor to train or test processes.
The usages of edge devices with limited power and computational resources such as
smartphones or surveillance cameras have been rapidly increased. On the other hand, cloud
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or powerful servers have been steadily backing up the edge devices by providing robust
storage and computational resources.
Outsourcing is a way to shift away from the service from the user (edge device) with
limited resources to the cloud environment with strong computational resources in order to
store data or solve complex problems[101, 102]. However, sending users’ data to the cloud
may expose the users’ privacy. For example, biomedical images contain private information
of users that should not be revealed [103, 104].
Privacy-preserving outsourcing means implementing a process on the cloud resources
while protecting the users’ private information. The problem of privacy-preserving outsourcing is similar to the concept of zero trust framework, i.e., we do not trust any party,
particularly the cloud environment, for accessing the real data (noisy image patches) [105].
This is an ideal case from the security perspective. However, the cloud requires data to
implement our requested task.
There are many strong data encryption methods, but such methods generate encrypted
data that cannot be used (or harder to be used with) to implement the denoising task.
Therefore, before proposing or using any data encryption method, we must have knowledge
about the task’s properties and requirements, then choose an appropriate encryption method
that preserves privacy and enables the cloud to perform the task accurately. This process
is similar to homomorphic encryption methods, where the cloud is able to execute the task
over encrypted confidential data without decrypting them [106].
On the other hand, some non-training-based denoising methods yield moderate denoising
results and can be implemented on edge devices. However, when a client demands highquality denoising and pays the cost of outsourcing in terms of time and communication
bandwidth, he does not expect to lose quality due to the applied privacy-preserving method.
Otherwise, the client may not choose that privacy-preserving method, or even the problem
of shadow IT may come up.
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In this study, we propose a method that not only enables the cloud to perfectly implement
the image denoising task but also protects the private data of users. The summary of our
contributions are as follows:
• We propose lossless privacy-preserving image denoising, which maintains the denoising
quality and privacy of users concurrently.
• We theoretically prove the lossless property of this method. We also verify this property
by implementing our method on multiple noisy images.
• We show the robustness of the proposed approach against known-plaintext, brute-force,
and side-channel attacks.

3.2

Related Work
In the literature, there are some works particularly related to privacy-preserving image

denoising in the cloud environment [107, 108, 109, 110]. Before discussing those works, we
define two terminologies to categorize different privacy-preserving outsourcing methods:
• Lossless privacy-preserving outsourcing: refers to the case when the quality of image
denoising with and without applying the security model is the same. In other words,
image denoising quality based on privacy-preserving outsourcing is the same as regular
outsourcing.
• Lossy privacy-preserving outsourcing: is the case when cloud does the image denoising
task with some degradation compared to the case of regular outsourcing due to the
applied security model.
In [107], a privacy-preserving image denoising service on the cloud-side has been introduced. They used an image denoising technique based on deep neural networks (DNNs),
and via lightweight secret sharing and garbled circuits were able to preserve the privacy of
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image content on the cloud. Their security design could not maintain the perfect quality of
denoising service; hence it falls into the lossy privacy-preserving outsourcing category.
Zheng et al. [108] proposed DNN-based image denoising with security features based on
the homomorphic encryption model. This method requires training a DNN model, and the
user should stay online while interacting with the remote server for the denoising process.
Furthermore, their method is a lossy one as it cannot achieve the perfect denoising process.
Also, Zheng et al. in [109] used encrypted external databases in the cloud environment
and proposed a privacy-preserving image denoising method. They used a real-world image
dataset and achieved a comparable denoising quality, yet not perfect denoising quality.
Hu et al. [110] proposed a double-cipher architecture to implement privacy-preserving image denoising based on nonlocal means in encrypted images. They used a privacy-preserving
transform to generate one ciphertext, and a Paillier scheme to generate another ciphertext.
Paillier is a partially homomorphic encryption system that enables two types of operation:
multiplication of ciphertext by a plaintext number, and addition of two ciphertexts. They
used the first cipher for the nonlocal search and the second cipher to enable the mean filter.
Their proposed security scheme does not affect the time of denoising compared to regular
denoising, yet cannot achieve the perfect quality of denoising service.
While all aforementioned works tried to securely implement the denoising task, they
failed to achieve the exact quality of denoising compared to the regular outsourcing. In this
study, we use a well-known patch-based image denoising technique and propose a lossless
privacy-preserving image denoising method. We theoretically prove the lossless property of
this method, and our experiment results verify that this method achieves the exact quality of
denoising compared to the regular denoising task. We show how effectively this method can
preserve the privacy of the users’ data without losing the quality of image denoising tasks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first lossless privacy-preserving image denoising
method. The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner. In the next section,
the preliminary information about image denoising is introduced. In section 3.4 our proposed
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lossless privacy-preserving method is discussed, followed by the proof of lossless property and
security analysis. Section 3.5 contains the experimental results to verify the applicability of
this approach. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.

3.3

Preliminary

3.3.1 Image Denoising
One of the well-known image denoising methods is based on sparse and redundant representations of image patches over trained overcomplete dictionaries[91, 90]. By transferring
noisy signals into a sparse domain, we can separate some parts of noise from the noisy signal. Basically, transferring signals into a sparse domain enables us to separate noise from
the signal of interest. In Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3, a simple example to elaborate this property
of sparse representation is shown. By adding white Gaussian noise to the original signal
x(t) = 0.7 sin(100πt) + sin(240πt), and by using the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT), we
transformed the signal into the sparse (frequency) domain in which the effect of noise can be
clearly identified. The denoised signal can be obtained by putting a threshold in the sparse
domain and then transferring the signal back into the time domain.
In the aforementioned example, a fixed dictionary (DCT) was used. However, for more
complicated and practical signals such as a noisy image, training a specific dictionary in
order to have a more sparse representation can lead to more noise removal. With this
regard, patch-based image denoising algorithms have been proposed as an effective image
denoising method. The main objective function of patched-based image denoising is the
following optimization problem [91]

min ∥X − ΨS∥2F
Ψ,S

s.t ∀i ∥si ∥0 ≤ T0

where X ∈ Rnp contains p noisy image patches of size

√

n×

(3.2)
√
n pixels that have been

reshaped to vector xi ∈ Rn , and Ψ ∈ RnL is an overcomplete sparsifying dictionary ( Ψ =
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Figure 3.2: The original signal and its single-sided amplitude spectrum.
[ψ1 |ψ2 |...|ψL ] , ψi ∈ Rn , n < L), S ∈ RLp contains p sparse vectors si ∈ RL corresponding
to the patches in X . In topics related to sparsity and image denoising, the term dictionary
is referred to matrix, and every column of a dictionary is called atom. Also in (3.2), ∥.∥F
stands for the Frobenius norm which equals the square root of the sum of the squares of its
elements, and ∥.∥0 is the number of nonzero coefficients of si , and T0 is an positive integer
number and equals to the order of sparsity.
Equation (3.2) is an optimization problem with two objectives: finding an overcomplete
dictionary Ψ, and sparse representation matrix S which every column of this matrix should
have at most T0 nonzero elements. The noisy image patches X are the only available infor-
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Figure 3.3: The noisy signal and its single-sided amplitude spectrum.
mation to solve this problem. A common approach to solve this problem is breaking it into
two separate optimization problems[91]:
• Sparse coding: finding the S by assuming Ψ as a fixed known dictionary.
• Dictionary update: finding the Ψ by assuming S as a fixed, known matrix.
The initial value for the dictionary can be chosen in different ways, such as a random
matrix, part of the image patches, or designed based on prior knowledge. The algorithm
iterates between these two steps until there is no significant update in dictionary elements.
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3.3.2 Sparse Coding
Every noisy patch xi ∈ Rn can be represented as a linear combination of atoms Ψ =
P
[ψ1 |ψ2 |...|ψL ] , ψi ∈ Rn , n < L , i.e. xi = Ψsi = j=L
j=1 αj ψj where si = (α1 , α2 , ..., αL ). In the
sparse coding step, we suppose the dictionary is known. Ψ is an overcomplete dictionary
and yields an underdetermined system of equations where the number of unknowns is more
than the number of equations. Due to the rank deficiency of given Ψ, there are many s
that can be transferred to the same x. However, by adding a sparsity constraint on the s,
a unique sparse vector can be obtained or approximated. In this case, s is called a sparse
representation of x. With this regard, the first step can be done by solving the following
optimization problem:

min ∥si ∥0 s.t ∥xi − Ψsi ∥22 ≤ ϵ i = 1, 2, ..., p.

(3.3)

where ϵ is a small number. There are numerous algorithms [111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116] to
solve (3.3), the orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) [116] is a well-known greedy algorithm
with the order of complexity O(T0 nL). This algorithm is mostly used in image denoising
problems. After running the OMP algorithm for p times, sparse vectors {si }i=p
i=1 correspond
to noisy image patches {xi }i=p
i=1 are obtained.
3.3.3 Dictionary Update
In this step, the algorithm assumes X and S as fixed inputs and updates the dictionary
Ψ by minimizing the following error.

∥E ∥2F = ∥X − ΨS∥2F

(3.4)

There are different methods for updating a dictionary, but one of the best methods to
achieve minimum error is based on the method of optimal direction [91]. In this approach,
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we take the derivative of (2) with respect to the dictionary Ψ, and by zeroing the derivative
output, optimal dictionary based on given X and S can be obtained as follows.
∂∥E ∥2F
=0
∂Ψ
(X − ΨS)S T = 0

(3.5)

Ψopt = (XS T )(SS T )−1
Equation (3.5) gives the best local minimum error. After obtaining an updated Ψ, step
one is repeated to generate an updated sparse matrix. These two steps continue until there
are no considerable changes in the updating steps (depending on the given stop threshold).
For example after t iterations, the t th Ψopt and S are used to generate denoised image
th

th

patches, Xdenoised = Ψtopt S t , and by knowing the position of each patch and taking average
of pixels, we can recover the denoised image.
Implementing the two steps mentioned above requires solid computational resources. For
p noisy image patches and executing two steps for t iterations, we need to run t × p times an
OMP algorithm and t times (3.5). In real applications, the number of patches is huge and
requires powerful resources. One solution to handle this problem is outsourcing the denoising
task to the cloud. We propose lightweight encryption over noisy patches that enables the
cloud to implement the perfect denoising and preserve the privacy of data simultaneously.

3.4

Lossless Privacy-Preserving Image Denoising
This section proposes a novel approach to preserve the privacy of users’ data and the

quality of image denoising tasks. As discussed3.3.1, the required data that should be sent
to the cloud is the noisy image patches X and initial dictionary Ψ. We should encrypt the
noisy image patches to preserve users’ privacy. Then, we use some parts of image patches
as an initial dictionary.
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We use two random matrices so as to encrypt noisy image patches. For every noisy
image, we randomly permute the position of the patches with a random permutation matrix
U ∈ Rp×p . Then we multiply an orthonormal random matrix Q ∈ Rn×n (e.g. Gaussian
random matrix with independent and identically distributed random variables) by permuted
X as follows:


X ⋆ = XU

(3.6)


X́ = QX ⋆ = QXU
where X ⋆ is the permuted noisy patches matrix, and X́ is the encrypted noisy image patches
that are sent to the cloud for the image denoising task.
Then upon a user request of the denoising task, the cloud solves (3.2) with the encrypted
input data as follows:

min ∥X́ − Ψ́Ś∥2F

s.t ∀i ∥śi ∥0 ≤ T0

(3.7)

Ψ́,Ś

where Ś is the encrypted sparse matrix, and i th column of this matrix is śi . And Ψ́ = QΨ
is the encrypted sparsifying dictionary. T3.3.2, the cloud breaks (3.7) into two steps: sparse
coding and dictionary update to recover the denoised patches.

3.4.1 Proof of Lossless Property
We compare step by step solving the ordinary denoising (3.2) with that of the (3.7). In
the first step which is sparse coding, the cloud solves the following problem

min ∥śi ∥0 s.t ∥x́i − Ψ́śi ∥22 ≤ ϵ i = 1, 2, ..., p

(3.8)

where x́i is the i th column of the noisy image patches X́ . In (3.8), there is a norm-2 (Euclidean
norm) condition. When we multiply an orthonormal matrix with a vector, the norm-2 of
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that vector does not change. We substitute corresponding values of x́i = Qxi⋆ and Ψ́ = QΨ
in (3.8), and use the norm-2 property to simplify it as follows.



min ∥śi ∥0 s.t ∥Qxi⋆ − QΨśi ∥22 ≤ ϵ i = 1, 2, ..., p




∥Qxi⋆ − QΨśi ∥22 = ∥Q(xi⋆ − Ψśi )∥22 = ∥xi⋆ − Ψśi ∥22





 ⇒ min ∥śi ∥0 s.t ∥xi⋆ − Ψśi ∥22 ≤ ϵ i = 1, 2, ..., p

(3.9)

The final minimization problem in (3.9) gives the same result as (3.3). Notice that X ⋆
contains the same noisy image patches with different orders that do not affect the sparse
coding step. Hence, after this step, we would have the permuted sparse representation
Ś = SU corresponding to the X ⋆ . In Fig. 3.4, we illustrate an example of permuted sparse
coding. It is evident that after recovery, the results are the same; however, the order is not
the same as the regular case.

Figure 3.4: An example of showing the effect of permutation on the sparse coding step.
In the next step, we need to implement dictionary update by using the encrypted noisy
patches X́ and permuted sparse matrix Ś obtained from the last step. As we discussed in
section 3.3.3, we suppose X́ and Ś as fixed inputs, then we minimize the error ∥X́ − Ψ́Ś∥2F
by taking derivative with respect to the dictionary Ψ́, and by zeroing the derivative output,
optimal dictionary based on given X́ and Ś can be obtained as follows.
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Ψ́opt = (X́ Ś T )(Ś Ś T )−1

(3.10)

By substituting X́ = QXU and Ś = SU in (3.10), and regarding the orthonormal property of the permutation matrix, we can achieve a direct relationship between the regular
sparsifying dictionary and encrypted one as follows.



Ψ́opt = (QXUU T S T )(SUU T S T )−1




Ψ́opt = (QX S T )(SS T )−1





Ψ́opt = QΨopt

(3.11)

After running t times the first and second steps, when there is no further update on
dictionary elements, the algorithm will be stopped, and the t th encrypted sparse matrix
Ś and sparsifying dictionary Ψ́opt will be used to generate encrypted denoised patches as
follows.

th
th

X́denoised = Ψ́topt
Ś t

(3.12)


X́denoised = (QΨt th )(S t th U) = QXdenoised U
opt
The service provider in the cloud generates X́denoised which is an encrypted (permuted
and perturbed) version of ordinary denoised patches. The real user by having the real keys
Q and U, and calling the decryption function (Dec(.)) can decrypt the cloud’s output with
minimal complexity as follows.

Dec(X́denoised ) = Q T X́denoised U T = Xdenoised

(3.13)

Then, by knowing the position of each patch and taking the average of pixels, the real user
can obtain the denoised image. Therefore our proposed method can perfectly maintain the
quality of denoising. In the next section, we analyze the robustness of the proposed method,
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and we show how this method completely perturbs the statistical and visual information of
the noisy image.

3.4.2 Security Analysis
One challenging attack in security designs is called known-plaintext attack (KPA) [117,
118]. In this type of attack, the attacker or curious cloud has access to the plaintext and
corresponding ciphertext. The attacker tries to guess the private keys in order to decrypt
the future ciphertexts. In our proposed method, the user generates new private keys for
every denoising request. In other words, for every noisy image, the user generates two new
and independent random matrices so as to prevent potential KPA attacks. Since the keys
are updated in each session, the attacker cannot use the previous keys to decrypt the future
ciphertexts.
We also consider a scenario in which an attacker tries to implement a brute force attack
to obtain the keys: random permutation matrix U ∈ Rp×p and an orthonormal random
matrix Q ∈ Rn×n . There is p! (! represents the factorial operation) possible permutation
matrices ∈ Rp×p . Similar to every cryptosystem, the length of the key(s) or the extent of
search space plays an important role in defining the level of secrecy of that cryptosystem.
In patched-based image denoising problems, p, the number of noisy image patches is large.
√
√
√
Given an r × r pixels image, there are p = (r − n + 1)2 possible n × n pixels patches. For
example, for a small image of size 32× 32 pixels, and patch size 8× 8 pixels, the number of
possible patches is p = (32-8+1)2 = 625, and the number of possible permutation matrices
is 625! which is a huge number. It is very hard to calculate this number even with the
powerful resources available on the cloud. In practice, the size of p is much larger than 625,
for example in [91] and [92], p = 11000 and p = 50000 patches have been used, respectively.
In addition, if we suppose that the attacker estimates the permutation matrix, she still
needs to guess the perturbation matrix Q. Since we update the Q in every session, it is
similar to a one-time random projection method. Authors in [119] theoretically proved the
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strength of this type of encryption against different attack scenarios. They reached this
point that if in every session a new and large enough non-Gaussian random matrix Q to be
used, only the energy of each patch would be leaked. However, if we use a Gaussian random
matrix, there would not be any leak of information. A direct consequence of their result is
the fact that the attacker would not obtain any information from the given ciphertext if we
use a random Gaussian matrix.
We further evaluated the strength of our method against the side-channel attack [120].
In this type of attack, the attacker (a curious cloud or a man-in-the-middle) measures the
difference between execution times in order to estimate the keys. Since we only encrypt the
data, our method does not impose any extra task on the cloud side. In other words, the
cloud executes the same procedure if the noisy image is sent. One important consequence of
this property is having close processing times which can nullify a side-channel attack.
We verified this claim by running a systematic experiment to compare the execution
times. In Fig. 3.5, we compare the execution times of the denoising process with and
without proposed encryption. In this experiment, the Baseline and Proposed refer to the
denoising process with the noisy data (plaintext) and encrypted noisy data (ciphertext),
respectively. To have reliable results, we repeated the experiment 100 times, and each
time we used new random keys to encrypt the data. We implemented all processes in the
MATLAB environment on a system with specifications of 16G RAM and processor Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-8550U CPU @ 1.80GHz. The size of the noisy image was 64×64 pixels. We set
the size of the sliding window to 8×8 pixels and generated 3249 noisy patches. The results
show that the execution time of the proposed approach closely follows the baseline.
In Table 3.1, we present the average execution times on client and cloud-side. On the
cloud-side, the average execution times of the proposed method (49.65 seconds) and baseline
(49.48 seconds) are very close. Hence, the attacker cannot implement the side-channel attack
based on measuring the execution times. Besides, in Table 3.1, the average execution times in
client-side (encryption plus decryption) is much lower than that of the cloud-side. It verifies
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Table 3.1: The average execution times (seconds) of running denoising algorithm with
noisy images (baseline) and encrypted noisy images (proposed) on the cloud-side.
Cloud-Side Denoising
Proposed
Baseline
49.65
49.48
Client-Side: Encryption plus Decryption
0.56
the high complexity of the denoising process and the reason to outsource the denoising task
to the cloud.
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Figure 3.5: Comparing the execution times of running denoising task on noisy patches
(baseline) and encrypted noisy patches on the cloud-side (proposed).

3.5

Experimental Results
In this section, we compare the proposed method to the baseline to verify the lossless

property. In addition, we compare our method with the previous works to show its superiority
in maintaining the quality of denoising. In this study, we use five images ’House, Boat,
Barbara, Lena, Fruits’ that are mostly used for evaluating the quality of image denoising
techniques. The size of the original images were 256×256 pixels, and to generate the noisy
images and accordingly noisy patches, we used white additive Gaussian noise with two levels
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of noise, σ = 15 and σ = 20. Also, we used a Gaussian random matrix with independent
and identically distributed random variables to generate the perturbation key.
We used two quantitative measures: peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and structural
similarity index (SSIM) to evaluate the performance of this method compared to the baseline.
PSNR measures the ratio between the maximum possible power of the input image and the
power of corrupting noise that affects the representation of the image. Also, SSIM is a
perceptual metric that takes both original and noisy images to evaluate the image quality
degradation. It ranges 0<SSIM<1, higher SSIM means a higher quality of denoising. Table
3.2 shows the comparison results. The baseline refers to the case that we do not encrypt
the data, i.e., implementing ordinary denoising on the plaintext. Then, we encrypted the
noisy patches and re-ran the same denoising algorithm on this encrypted data. After doing
denoising, we decrypted the image, and as presented in Table 3.2, the quality of the proposed
method is exactly the same as the quality of the baseline. This experiment verifies our claim
about the lossless property of this method.
Furthermore, we compared the average loss of previous works with the proposed method
in σ = 20. As presented in Table 3.3, previous works cannot maintain the quality of image
denoising. For the brevity and since we proposed a solid theoretical proof for the lossless
property, we omitted the results for other σ values and images. We released our MATLAB
code publicly for reproducibility and future comparisons3 .
In addition, Fig. 3.6 illustrates the effect of perturbation on the cloud. The first column
from the left corresponds to the noisy images with σ = 20, the second column corresponds to
the denoised images based on the ordinary method (baseline), the third column corresponds
to the encrypted images that have been denoised on the cloud, yet not decrypted. And the
fourth column shows the decrypted image by the real user. This experiment shows that while
the cloud does the denoising task, it will have a completely noise-like image. Therefore, the
cloud would not be able to observe the content of images. Also, the real user can decrypt and
3

https://github.com/hadizand/privacy-preserving-image-denoising.git
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Table 3.2: Comparing the quality of proposed privacy-preserving image denoising
outsourcing with the regular outsourcing (baseline).
Image

House

Boat

Barbara

Lena

Peppers

σ = 15

Method

σ = 20

PSNR

SSIM

PSNR

SSIM

Noisy

24.64

0.44

22.16

0.34

Baseline

30.46

0.69

27.94

0.58

Proposed

30.46

0.69

27.94

0.58

Noisy

24.70

0.58

22.20

0.48

Baseline

29.76

0.80

27.68

0.71

Proposed

29.76

0.80

27.68

0.71

Noisy

24.64

0.61

22.19

0.45

Baseline

30.56

0.84

28.42

0.76

Proposed

30.56

0.84

28.42

0.76

Noisy

24.63

0.52

22.15

0.42

Baseline

30.55

0.78

28.17

0.68

Proposed

30.55

0.78

28.17

0.68

Noisy

24.82

0.59

22.37

0.49

Baseline

30.52

0.83

28.43

0.75

Proposed

30.52

0.83

28.43

0.75

Table 3.3: Comparing the average loss of proposed method with previous works.
LSH-voting [107]
External DB [107]
Denoising in the dark [109]
Proposed

Loss in PSNR
0.74
0.52
0.25
0

Loss in SSIM
0.10
0.08
0
0
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access the denoised image by having the keys. As shown in Fig. 3.6, our proposed method
does not affect the visual features of the denoising task.

3.6

Conclusion
In this study, we proposed a novel lossless privacy-preserving image denoising method

that protects the private data within noisy images and maintains the quality of the denoising
task concurrently. In this method, we used two random keys to permute and perturb the
noisy image to transform the noisy patches into an encrypted signal. Cloud implemented
the denoising task on this encrypted signal. After denoising, the output signal was still
encrypted, and the real user would be able to decrypt the denoised image by knowing the
keys. We evaluated the security of this method against known plaintext and brute-force
attacks. Also, we theoretically proved the lossless property of this method. We also verified
the applicability of this approach by implementing our experiments on five real images, and
two well-known evaluation metrics, PSNR and SSIM, were used to compare our results with
the baseline. Our results show that this method can maintain the quality of denoising while
imposing limited complexity to the client and cloud sides.
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Figure 3.6: Experiment results of visual information exposed in the cloud-side, and
comparing the quality of denoised image with the baseline.
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